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Abstract
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), sometimes called probabilistic safety anal-
ysis, quantifies the risk of undesired events in industrial facilities. However, one of
the weaknesses that undermines the credibility and usefulness of this technique is
the uncertainty in PRA results. Fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree analysis
(ETA) are the most important PRA techniques for evaluating system reliabilities
and likelihoods of accident scenarios. Uncertainties, as incompleteness and impre-
cision, are present in probabilities of undesired events and failure rate data. Fur-
thermore, both FTA and ETA traditionally assume that events are independent,
assumptions that are often unrealistic and introduce uncertainties in data and
modeling when using FTA and ETA. This work explores uncertainty handling
approaches for analyzing the fault trees and event trees (method of moments) as a
way to overcome the challenges of PRA. Applications of the developed frameworks
and approaches are explored in illustrative examples, where the probability distri-
butions of the top event of fault trees are obtained through the propagation of
uncertainties of the failure probabilities of basic events. The application of the
method of moments to propagate uncertainty of log-normal distributions showed
good agreement with results available in the literature using different methods.
Keywords: accident, fault tree, event tree, nuclear, probabilistic risk assessment,
reliability, uncertainty
1. Introduction
Accidents at industrial facilities may result in serious consequences to workers,
public, property, and the environment. Risk management approaches are aimed at
insuring that processes and systems are designed and operated to meet “acceptable
or tolerable risk levels” as required by regulatory bodies. Risk assessment usually
encompasses the following steps: hazard identification, risk analysis, and risk eval-
uation. When the risk evaluation is carried out in a quantitative way, the risk
assessment is considered a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).
Fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA) are the most used
techniques in PRAs. However, uncertainties in PRAs may lead to inaccurate risk
level estimations and consequently to wrong decisions [1]. Lack of knowledge about
systems under study during the PRAs is one of the main causes of uncertainties,
which leads to simplification of assumptions, as well as imprecision and
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inaccuracies in the parameters used as inputs to PRA (e.g., component reliabilities,
failure probabilities, and human error rates).
A framework to use the method of moments for determining the likelihoods of
different outcomes from event trees in an uncertain data environment using fault
trees is described in this work. Illustrative examples using this approach for propa-
gating uncertainty in basic events of fault trees, following log-normal distributions,
are also presented. The probability distributions of top events are compared with
analyses available in the literature using different approaches, such as Monte Carlo
simulation and Wilks and Fenton-Wilkinson methods.
2. Basics of risk assessment
There are many concepts of risk used in different scientific, technological, or
organization areas. In a general sense, risk can be defined as the potential of loss
(e.g., material, human, or environment) resulting from exposure to a hazard (e.g.,
fire, explosion, or earthquake). Sometimes, risk is measured through the assessment
of the probability of occurrence of an undesired event and the magnitude of conse-
quences [2]. In this way, risk assessment encompasses the answers to the following
questions [3]:
• What can go wrong that may lead to an outcome of hazard exposure
(scenario Si)?
• How likely is this to happen, and if so, what is its frequency (Fi)?
• If it happens, what are the likely consequences (Ci)?
Therefore, risk, Ri, for a scenario Si, can be quantitatively expressed as function
of these three variables, as given by Eq. (1):
Ri ¼ f Si;Fi;Cið Þ: (1)
According to Christensen et al. [4], hazard is an inherent property of a risk
source potentially causing consequences or effects. This hazard concept does not
include the probability of adverse outcome, which is the core difference from risk
term. In this chapter, hazard is then considered as the properties of agents or
situations capable of having adverse effects on facilities, human health, or environ-
ment, such as dangerous substance, sources of energy, or natural phenomena.
2.1 Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
PRA provides an efficient way for quantifying the risks, even in an environment
of uncertainties regarding possible scenarios, data, or modeling. Risk assessment is
part of risk management carried out before deciding about risk treatment and
prioritizing actions to reduce risks (risk-based decision-making). Figure 1 shows a
framework for PRA under uncertainty environment [5, 6].
PRA starts with the hazard identification and scenario development, proceeds
through quantification of frequencies and consequences, and ends with risk analysis
and evaluation [5].
The first step of a PRA process consists of finding, recognizing, and recording
risk sources (hazard identification). The accident scenario development (sequence
or chain of undesired events) consists of identifying the initiating events (IEs) and
2
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the sequences of events following these IEs. The latter are the critical events that
initiate an accident, such as pipe rupture, overpressures, or explosion. The
sequences of events are the combinations of success or failure of the barriers or
controls requested by IEs (defense-in-depth layers), for example, emergency shut-
down systems, human actions, or physical protection. Each sequence can lead to a
desired or undesired outcome (end state) such as uncontrollable release of toxic
gases, radiation exposure, or facility shutdown [6].
Fault trees (FTs) and event trees (ETs) are often used in PRAs for quantifying
the likelihood of event sequences. FTs quantify frequencies or probabilities of top
events (such as IEs or failure of defense-in-depth layers) through causal relation-
ship of basic events (e.g., system components, human actions, or subsystems). ETs
identify and evaluate each sequence frequency using data generated by FTs [5].
The consequence assessment of each accident scenario to people, property, or
environment depends on many factors, such as magnitude of the event, number of
people exposed to harm, atmospheric conditions, mitigating measures, etc. The
consequence modeling involves the use of analytical or empirical physical or phe-
nomenological models, such as plume dispersion, blast impact (TNT equivalent), or
Monte Carlo simulation [7, 8].
Risk analysis is the combination and integration of the probabilities (or
frequencies) and the consequences for identified hazards, taking into account the
effectiveness of any existing controls and barriers. It provides an input to risk
evaluation and decisions about risk treatment and risk management strategies [6].
There are many uncertainties associated with the analysis of risk related to both
probability and consequence assessments. An assessment of uncertainties is neces-
sary to perform risk evaluation and to take decisions. The major categories of
uncertainties are associated with data, methods, and models used to identify and
analyze risks. Uncertainty assessment involves the determination of the variation or
imprecision in the results, based on uncertainties of basic parameters and
assumptions used in the analyses. Uncertainty propagation of failure probability
distributions in FTs and ETs, as well as variability analysis of physical processes
(named stochastic uncertainty) and the uncertainties in knowledge of these
processes (named epistemic uncertainty), have to be properly accounted for in
PRA results [9].
Risk evaluation involves comparing estimated levels of risk with risk criteria
defined, once the context of analysis has been established. Uncertainty assessment
is important to adjust the categorization of the risk ranking, supporting the
Figure 1.
Framework for probabilistic risk assessment under uncertainty (based on Refs. [5, 6]).
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decision-makers in meeting risk criteria of standards and guidelines, as well as in
visualizing and communicating risks [10].
2.2 Techniques for PRA
The main techniques used for probabilistic risk assessment are fault tree analysis
(FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA) [11].
FTA is a graphical relationship among events leading to a “top event” at the apex
of the tree. Beginning with the top event, the intermediate events are hierarchically
placed at different levels until the required level of detail is reached (the basic
events at the bottom of the tree). The interactions between the top event and
other events can be generally represented by “OR” or “AND” gates, as shown in
Figure 2(a) and (b), respectively.
Minimal cut sets (MCSs) of a fault tree are the combinations of basic events
which are the shortest pathways that lead to the top event. MCSs are used for
qualitative and quantitative assessments of fault trees and can be identified with
support of Boolean algebra, specialized algorithms, or computer codes [12]. The
probability of the top event can be assessed if the probability values or probability
density functions (pdfs) of the basic events are available, using the identified MCSs.
For instance, using the set theory concepts [13], the probability equations of the two
FTs in Figure 2(a) and (b) can be expressed by Eqs. (2) and (3), respectively:
P A or Bð Þ ¼ P AUBð Þ ¼ P Að Þ þ P Bð Þ  P A∩Bð Þ, (2)
P A and Bð Þ ¼ P A∩Bð Þ ¼ P AjBð Þ P Bð Þ ¼ P BjAð Þ P Að Þ, (3)
where P(A) and P(B) are the independent probabilities of the basic events and
P(A|B) and P(B|A) are the conditional (dependent) probabilities.
ETA is also a graphical logic model that identifies and quantifies possible out-
comes (accident scenarios) following an undesired initiating event [14]. It provides
systematic analysis of the time sequence of intermediate events (e.g., success or
failure of defense-in-depth layers, as protective system or operator interventions),
until an end state is reached. Consequences can be direct (e.g., fires, explosions) or
indirect (e.g., domino effects on adjacent plants or environmental consequences).
Figure 2.
Intermediate events connected by “OR” (a) and “AND” (b) gates in a fault tree.
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Figure 3 shows an example of an event tree construction, starting with the
initiating event of frequency of occurrence, λ, where P1 and P2 are the probabilities
of subsequent events (event 1 and event 2) leading to the possible scenarios S1, S2,
S3, and S4, with frequencies F1, F2, F3, and F4, respectively, each one with different
consequences. If the success and the failure of each event are mutually exclusive
(binary trees) and the probabilities of event occurrence are independent of each
other, the frequency of each scenario is calculated as shown in Figure 3.
2.3 Uncertainty sources in PRA
Many types of data must be collected and treated for use in PRAs in order to
quantify the accident scenarios and accident contributors. Data include, among
others, component reliability and failure rates, repair times, initiating event proba-
bilities, human error probabilities, and common cause failure (CCF) probabilities.
These data are usually represented by uncertainty bounds or probability density
functions, measuring the degree of knowledge or confidence in the available data.
Uncertainties can be highly significant in risk-based decisions and are important
for establishing research priorities after a PRA process. For well-understood basic
events for which a substantial experience base exists, the uncertainties may be
small. When data from experience are limited, the probability of basic events may
be highly uncertain, and even knowing that a given probability is small, most of the
time one does not know how small it is.
The development of scenarios in a PRA introduces uncertainties about both
consequences and probabilities. Random changing of physical processes is an
example of stochastic uncertainties, while the uncertainties due to lack of knowl-
edge about these processes are the epistemic uncertainties. Component failure rates
and reliability data are typically uncertain, sometimes because unavailability of
information and sometimes because doubts about the applicability of available data.
PRA of complex engineering systems such as those in nuclear power plants
(NPPs) and chemical plants usually exhibits uncertainties arising from inadequate
assumptions, incompleteness of modeling, CCF and human reliability issues, and
lack of plant-specific data. For this type of facility, the major of sources of uncer-
tainties are [15]:
• Uncertainties in input parameters—parameters of the models (e.g., FTs and
ETs) for estimating event probabilities and assessing magnitude consequences
Figure 3.
Sequence of events in an event tree leading to different accident scenarios.
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are not exactly known because of the lack of data, variability of plants,
processes or components, and inadequate assumptions.
• Modeling uncertainty—inadequacy of conceptual, mathematical, numerical,
and computational models.
• Uncertainty about completeness—systematic expert reviewing can minimize
the difficulties in assessing or quantifying this type of uncertainty.
The main focus of this work is the treatment of uncertainties regarding numer-
ical values of the parameters used in fault and event trees in the scope of PRA and
their propagation in these models. If a probability density function (pdf) is pro-
vided for the basic events (e.g., normal, log-normal, or triangular), a pdf or confi-
dence bounds can be obtained for an FT top event or an ET scenario sequence.
3. Methods of uncertainty propagation used in PRA
There are several available methods for propagating uncertainties such as ana-
lytical methods (method of moments and Fenton-Wilkinson (FW) method), Monte
Carlo simulation, Wilks method (order statistic), and fuzzy set theory. They are
different from each other, in terms of characterizing the input parameter uncer-
tainty and how they propagate from parameter level to output level [16].
The analytical methods consist in obtaining the distribution of the output of a
model (e.g., fault or event trees) starting from probability distribution of input
parameters. An exact analytical distribution of the output however can be derived
only for specific models such as normal or log-normal distributions [17].
The Fenton-Wilkinson (FW) method is a kind of analytical technique of
approximating a distribution using log-normal distribution with the same moments.
It is a moment-matching method for obtaining an exact analytical distribution for
the output (closed form). This kind of closed form is helpful, when more detailed
uncertainty analyses are required, for instance, in parametric studies involving
uncertainty importance assessments, which require re-estimating the overall
uncertainty distribution many times [18].
The method of moments is another kind of analytical method where the calcu-
lations of the mean, variance, and higher order moments are based on approximate
models (generally using Taylor series). As the method is only an approximation,
when the variance in the input data are large, higher order terms in the Taylor
expansion have to be included. This introduces much more complexity in the
analytical model, especially for complex original models, as in the case of PRAs [19].
The Monte Carlo simulation estimates the output parameter (e.g., probability of
the top event of an FT) by simulating the real process and its random behavior in a
computer model. It estimates the output occurrence by counting the number of
times an event occurs in simulated time, starting to sample the pdf from the input
data [20].
The fuzzy set theory is used when empirical information for input data are
limited and probability theory is insufficient for representing all type of uncer-
tainties. In this case, the so-called possibility distributions are subjectively assigned
to input data, and fuzzy arithmetic is carried out. For uncertainty analysis in FTAs,
instead of assuming the input parameter as a random variable, it is considered as a
fuzzy number, and the uncertainty is propagated to the top event [21].
The Wilks method is an efficient sampling approach, based on order statistics,
which can be used to find upper bounds to specified percentiles of the output
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distribution. Order statistics are statistics based on the order of magnitudes and do
not need assumptions about the shape of input or output distributions. According to
the authors’ knowledge, this method has been of little use in the field of reliability
modeling and PRA, although it is used in other aspects of NPP safety, such as
uncertainty in input parameters associated with the loss-of-coolant accident
(LOCA) phenomena [22].
The mentioned methods for uncertainty propagation have many differences
and similarities, advantages and disadvantages, as well as benefits and limitations.
Table 1 summarizes a comparison of these methods.
A brief discussion about the comparison of the mentioned methods is given as
follows.
The method of moments is an efficient technique that does not require the
specification of the probabilistic distributions of the basic event probabilities. It is
difficult to be applied to complex fault trees with many replicated events [23]. This
can be solved with the use of computer codes that automatically get the minimal cut
sets (MCSs) of the fault trees. It is a simple method, easily explainable and suited for
screening studies, due to inherent conservatism and simplicity [24].
The Monte Carlo simulation is computationally intensive for large and complex
systems and requires pdf of input data. It has the disadvantage of not readily
revealing the dominant contributors to the uncertainties. With current computer
technology and availability of user-friendly software for Monte Carlo simulation,
computational cost is no longer a limitation.
The fuzzy set theory does not need detailed empirical information like the shape
of distribution, dependencies, and correlations. Fuzzy numbers are a good repre-
sentation of uncertainty when empirical information is very scarce. It is inherently
conservative because the inputs are treated as fully correlated [25].
The Fenton-Wilkinson (FW) method improves the understanding of the con-
tributions to the uncertainty distribution and reduces the computational costs
involved, for instance, in conventional Monte Carlo simulation for uncertainty
Method Propagation
technique
Benefits Limitations
Method of
moments
Analytical
(probability
theory and
statistics)
Conceptually simple and does not
require the specification of pdf of
input data
Difficult to apply for complex
systems and large fault trees
Monte
Carlo
simulation
Simulation Estimates are closes to exact
solutions, especially for simple
and small systems
Computationally intensive for large
and complex systems. Requires pdf
of input data and does not reveal
contributors to the uncertainty
Fuzzy set
theory
Fuzzy
arithmetic
It does not require detailed
information of pdf. Suited when
empirical information is very
scarce
It is inherently conservative
because the inputs are treated in a
fully correlated way
Fenton-
Wilkinson
(FW)
method
Analytical
(closed-form
approximation)
Improves understanding of
contributions to uncertainties
and has low computational costs
Closed form for top events is not
easily obtained. Applicable only to
log-normal distribution. Estimates
are most accurate in the central
range
Wilks
method
Order statistics Conservative and
computationally inexpensive
Low accuracy in low tails of the
distributions
Table 1.
Comparison of methods for uncertainty propagation.
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estimation. It is applicable only when the uncertainties in the basic events of the
model are log-normally distributed. FW estimates are most accurate in the central
range, and the tails of the distributions are poorly represented. The Wilks method
requires relatively few samples and is computationally inexpensive. It is useful for
providing an upper bound (conservative) for the percentiles of the uncertainty
distribution. However, its calculated values are less accurate than the FW
estimates over practically the entire range of the distribution. For both Wilks and
FW methods, the greatest errors are found in the low tails of the distributions, but
in almost all reliability applications the high tails are of more interest than the
low tails [26].
4. Method of moments for uncertainty propagation in FTA and ETA
The method of moments uses first and second moments of the input parameters
(mean and variance) to estimate the mean and variance of the output function
using propagation of variance or coefficient of variation. As a measure of uncer-
tainty, the coefficient of variation is defined as a ratio of the standard deviation to
the mean, which indicates the relative dispersion of uncertain data around the
mean. The uncertainty measure is a readily interpretable and dimensionless mea-
sure of error, differently for standard deviation, which is not dimensionless [27].
In PRA, the method of moments can be used to propagate the uncertainties of
the inputs (i.e., event probabilities) and propagate the uncertainty for the outputs.
The probability density functions (pdfs) for the inputs can be estimated from
reliability data of gathered components or from historical records of undesired
events. Hypothesizing that the events (or basic events) are independent, probabi-
listic approaches for propagating uncertainties in FTs and ETs are given as follows
in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively [28].
4.1 Method of moments applied to FTA
The uncertainty propagation in a fault tree begins with the propagation of
uncertainties of basic events through “OR” and “AND” gates, until it reaches the
top event. The fault tree should be represented by MCSs in order to avoid direct
dependence between intermediate events, facilitating probabilistic calculations.
For an “OR” gate of a fault tree, the probability of the output event, Por, is given
by Eq. (4):
Por ¼ 1
Yn
i¼1
1 Pið Þ, (4)
where Pi denotes the probability of ith (i = 1, 2, 3, …, n) independent events
(or basic events) and n is the number of input events.
The uncertainty propagation through the “OR” gate is given by Eq. (5) that
calculates the coefficient of variation of output, C0or, as function of the coefficients
of variation of inputs, C0i, according to Eqs. (6) and (7) [29]:
1þ C´2or ¼
Yn
i¼1
1þ C´2i
 
, (5)
C0or ¼
sor
1 Por , (6)
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C0i ¼
si
1 Pi , (7)
where si denotes the standard deviations of ith (i = 1, 2, 3, …, n) input, n is the
number of input events, and sor is the standard deviation of the output of “OR” gate.
For an “AND” gate of a fault tree, the probability of output event, Pand, is
given by Eq. (8):
Pand ¼
Yn
i¼1
Pi, (8)
where Pi denotes the probability of ith (i = 1, 2, 3, …, n) independent events
(or basic events) and n is the number of input events.
The uncertainty propagation through the “AND” gate is given by Eq. (9). It
calculates the coefficient of variation of output, Cand, as function of the coefficients
of variation of inputs, Ci, according to Eqs. (10) and (11) [29]:
1þ C2and ¼
Yn
i¼1
1þ C2i
 
, (9)
Cand ¼ sand
Pand
, (10)
Ci ¼ si
Pi
, (11)
where si denotes the standard deviations of ith (i = 1, 2, 3, …, n) input, n is
the number of input events, and sand is the standard deviation of output of the
“AND” gate.
4.2 Method of moments applied to ETA
Uncertainty propagation in an event tree is similar (or analogous) to uncertainty
propagation of an “AND” gate of a fault tree. The frequency of occurrence of each
accident scenario, Fseq, is given by Eq. (12),
Fseq ¼ λ
Yn
i¼1
Pi, (12)
where λ is the frequency of occurrence of the initiating event and Pi denotes
the probabilities of ith (i = 1, 2, 3, …, n) subsequent independent events leading to
the accident scenario and n is the number of input events. These values can be
obtained from fault trees constructed for each ith event or system failure of the
event tree.
The uncertainty propagation through the accident sequence is given by Eq. (13)
that provides the coefficient of variation of accident sequence, Cseq, as function of
the coefficients of variation of subsequent events, Ci, according to Eqs. (14) and
(15), respectively:
1þ C2seq ¼
Yn
i¼1
1þ C2i
 
, (13)
Cseq ¼
sseq
Fseq
, (14)
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Ci ¼ si
Pi
, (15)
where si denotes the standard deviations of ith (i = 1, 2, 3, …, n) subsequent
event of the sequence, n is the number of input events, and sseq is the standard
deviation of the accident sequence.
4.3 Propagation of log-normal distributions
Many uncertainty distributions associated with the basic events of fault trees
(reliability or failure probability data) often can be approximated in reliability and
safety studies by log-normal functions. If a random variable ln(x) has a normal
distribution, the variable x has then a log-normal distribution. The log-normal
probability density function (pdf), f(x) is then given by Eq. (16) [30]:
f xð Þ ¼ 1
xσ
ffiffiffiffiffi
2π
p exp  ln xð Þ  μð Þ
2
2σ2
 !
, (16)
where μ and σ are the mean and the standard deviation of ln(x), respectively
(i.e., these are the parameters of the “underlying” normal distribution).
The error factor, EF, of a log-normal pdf is defined as Eq. (17):
EF ¼ χ95
χ50
¼ χ50
χ5
, (17)
where χ95, χ50, and χ5 are the 95th, 50th (median), and 5th percentiles,
respectively.
EF is often used as an alternative to the standard deviation of “underlying”
normal distribution, σ, for characterizing the spread of a log-normal distribution,
and these two quantities are related by Eq. (18):
EF ¼ exp 1:645 σð Þ: (18)
The mean, P, and standard deviation, s, of the log-normal variable, x, can be
given by the following Eqs. (19) and (20), respectively:
P ¼ exp μþ σ
2
2
 
, (19)
s ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
exp 2μþ σ2ð Þ exp σ2ð Þ  1½ 
q
(20).
Eqs. (4)–(20) are used for uncertainty propagation of log-normal pdf in fault
and event trees, as illustrated in the following examples.
5. Illustrative examples
In order to validate the proposed approach for implementing the method of
moments, two cases were tested.
5.1 Case study 1
The first case, taken from Chang et al. [8], introduces a fault tree (Figure 4)
describing a generic top event “system failure,” T, with seven basic events (X(1) to
10
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X(7)), characterized by the log-normal distributions. This simple example was
chosen in order to compare the results of the method of moments with the uncer-
tainty propagation analyses using Monte Carlo simulation.
The log-normal distributions assigned to the basic events (represented by
median and mean values of probabilities, error factors, and standard deviations) are
shown in Table 2. An analysis of the fault tree shows that its minimal cut sets
(MCSs) are X(1), X(6), X(7), X(2)X(4), X(2)X(5), X(3)X(4), and X(3)X(5), which
are used to estimate the top event probability and propagate the uncertainties. The
application of the method of moments is carried out in a bottom-up approach.
Starting from basic events of the fault tree, the coefficients of variation of the
intermediate events are estimated using Eqs. (4)–(7) for “OR” gates and
Eqs. (8)–(11) for “AND” gates. This procedure is repeated interactively until the top
event is reached, and its standard deviation is obtained. Considering that, in the
same way as the basic events, the top event has also a log-normal distributions,
Eqs. (16)–(20) are used to estimate the 5th percentile, median, and 95th percentile
for the top event, as shown in Table 3. These estimates are slightly lower than the
values obtained by Chang et al. [8] with the Monte Carlo simulation (percent
Figure 4.
Fault tree analysis for a generic top event “system failure” (adapted from Chang et al. [8]).
Basic
events
Median of log-
normal pdf (χ50)
EF of log-
normal pdf
Mean of log-
normal pdf (P)
Standard deviation of log-
normal pdf (s)
X(1) 1.00  103 3 1.25  103 9.37  104
X(2) 3.00  102 3 3.75  102 2.81  102
X(3) 1.00  102 3 1.25  102 9.37  103
X(4) 3.00  103 3 3.75  103 2.81  103
X(5) 1.00  102 3 1.25  102 9.37  103
X(6) 3.00  103 3 3.75  103 2.81  103
X(7) 1.00  103 3 1.25  103 9.37  104
Table 2.
Basic event distribution for a generic top event “system failure” (χ50 and EF values were taken from Ref. [8]).
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difference less than 4%). This good agreement can also be verified through the
probability density function (obtained with Eq. (16)), as shown in Figure 5.
5.2 Case study 2
The second case study illustrates the application of the method of moments for
assessing the uncertainty of a fault tree taken from a probabilistic safety analysis of
a nuclear power plant (NPP). The fault tree shown in Figure 6 was constructed
using MCSs and basic event distributions provided by El-Shanawany et al. [26]. It
represents a fault tree analysis for the top event “nuclear power plant core melt,”
taking into account loss of off-site and on-site power systems and failure of core
residual heat removal. The basic events A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, and M are
related to off-site power system failure, operator errors, emergency diesel genera-
tors (EDGs) failures, pump failures, and common cause failures (CCFs). A detailed
description of each one of these basic events is given in the caption of Figure 6. An
accurate logical analysis of this drawn fault tree can demonstrate that its MCSs are
ABC, ABD, ABE, ABF, ABH, ABI, ABJ, AFG, and AKLMH, which describes the
illustrative example analyzed in the literature.
The log-normal distributions assigned to the basic events (represented by mean
values of probabilities, error factors, and standard deviations) are shown in
Table 4. Such distributions are also used in Ref. [26], to compare the results of this
Method 5th percentile Median 95th percentile
Monte Carlo simulation1 4.15  103 8.02  103 1.64  102
Method of moments2 3.99  103 7.95  103 1.58  102
% difference 3.8% 0.9% 3.5%
1Ref. [8].
2Current work.
Table 3.
Comparison of top event probabilities obtained by Monte Carlo simulation and by method of moments.
Figure 5.
Comparison of pdf obtained by method of moments and by the Monte Carlo simulation for the top event of
Figure 4.
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current work, using the method of moments, with the analyses of uncertainty
propagation using Wilks method, Monte Carlo simulation, and Fenton-Wilkinson
(FW) method.
Figure 6.
Fault tree analysis for a nuclear power plant core melt.
Basic
events
Mean of log-normal
pdf (P)
Error factor of log-normal
pdf (EF)
Standard deviation of log-
normal pdf (s)
A 6.00  102 5 7.60  102
B 6.60  106 5 8.36  106
C 1.00  102 5 1.27  102
D 2.13  103 5 2.70  103
E 8.33  104 5 1.06  103
F 5.20  105 5 6.59  105
G 6.10  105 5 7.73  105
H 4.20  105 5 5.32  105
I 1.58  103 5 2.00  103
J 1.00  104 5 1.27  104
K 9.00  102 5 1.14  101
L 1.00  101 5 1.27  101
M 1.20  104 5 1.52  104
Table 4.
Basic event distribution for illustrative example (P and EF values were taken from Ref. [26]).
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The application of the method of moments is carried out in a similar way as in the
first case study. Considering that the top event is also log-normally distributed, its 5th
percentile, median, and 95th percentile are estimated. As can be seen in Table 5, the
median values of the method of moments show a good agreement withWilks method
and are 25.8% and 20.4% greater than the results of Monte Carlo simulation and FW
method, respectively. This is also illustrated in Figure 7, where the cumulative dis-
tribution function obtained by method of moments is compared with the data in the
mentioned literature [26]. As can be seen, the results of the method of moments agree
reasonably with the Wilks method, being slightly lower, moving toward the analyses
of uncertainty propagation using Monte Carlo simulation, which is considered for
many purposes to be close to the exact solution for simple models.
Overall, uncertainty propagation using the method of moments in fault trees, as
shown in the two case studies, or in event trees, is quite simple in small systems and
does not require the specification of probability density functions of basic events
but only their means and standard deviations. For more complex systems and large
fault and event trees, computer implementation of the described bottom-up
approach can be performed, for instance, using specialized computer software for
obtaining the minimal cut sets and quantitatively assessing the top event
Method 5th
percentile
Median 95th
percentile
% difference of
median of method
of moments
Monte Carlo simulation1 8.80  1011 1.55  109 2.10  108 25.8%
Fenton-Wilkinson1 1.26  1010 1.62  109 2.08  108 20.4%
Wilks1 1.85  1010 1.95  109 2.46  108 0.0%
Moments2 1.65  1010 1.95  109 2.31  108 —
1Ref. [26].
2Current work.
Table 5.
Comparison of core melt frequency obtained by the method of moments with data from literature.
Figure 7.
Comparison of cumulative distribution function for core melt frequency obtained by the method of moments
with data from literature [26].
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probabilities [31], as well as matrix computations for obtaining the standard devia-
tions along the trees, as proposed by Simões Filho [32].
6. Final remarks
This work addresses the uncertainty propagation in fault and event trees in the
scope of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of industrial facilities. Given the
uncertainties of the primary input data (component reliability, system failure
probabilities, or human error rates), the method of moments is proposed for the
evaluation of the confidence bounds of top event probabilities of fault trees or event
sequence frequencies of event trees. These types of analyses are helpful in
performing a systematic PRA uncertainty treatment of risks and system reliabilities
associated with complex industrial facilities, mainly in risk-based decision-making.
Two illustrative examples using the method of moments for carrying out the
uncertainty propagation in fault trees are presented, and their results are compared
with available analyses in literature using different uncertainty assessment
approaches. The method of moments proved to be conceptually simple to be used. It
confirmed findings postulated in literature, when dealing with simple and small
systems. More complex systems will require the support of specialized reliability
and risk assessment software, in order to implement the proposed approach.
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